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Abstract
In times of shortage, how should New Mexico’s scarce water supply be allocated?
New Mexico’s prior appropriations doctrine gives a temporal preference of “first in time,
first in right,” as the rule for allocation. Unfortunately, in most basins, we do not know
with certainty who that “first” is, because rights have not been adjudicated. In 2004, the
New Mexico Legislature passed Active Water Resource Management (AWRM)
legislation which codified the Office of the State Engineer’s (OSE's) authority to
administer water rights in advance of adjudication if needed. The OSE promulgated
general regulations in 2004 implementing the legislation and district specific regulations
for seven priority basins are forthcoming. Both the general and proposed district specific
regulations allow for alternative administration, which consists of water sharing
agreements, which include shortage sharing. Shortage sharing basically allows all water
rights users in a particular basin to share the pain of low water years, ensuring that
everyone gets a little water. This contrasts with traditional priority date based
administration in which senior water rights holders get their full allocation of water
before junior holders get any.
While the AWRM as a whole has been controversial and further implementation
bogged down in litigation a series of water sharing agreements have been successfully
negotiated in the San Juan Basin. The San Juan agreement covers how to allocate water
in the basin in advance of the adjudication process, and also includes provisions for water
sharing during drought years.

Factors leading to the agreement’s success include the

nature of its administrative structure, its comprehensiveness, its flexibility, and the nature
of its water allocation procedures. This is consistent with other research into interstate
water sharing agreements.
In my paper I will first discuss the background of traditional priority
administration and water adjudications in the state of New Mexico, as well as delve into
the nature of the AWRM alternative, which serves as the basis for the formation of
shortage sharing agreements. I will next discuss some of the literature on large interstate
agreements. I will then derive principles from them that can be applied to smaller local
water sharing agreements. Finally, I will apply these to the San Juan Basin agreement,
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and discuss whether the agreement has been successful or not, and whether it could be
used as a model for other local water sharing agreements.
I conclude that although adjudications are absolutely necessary and traditional
priority date based administration will likely continue to be the most common method of
water allocation in New Mexico, water sharing agreements in advance of adjudications
can be useful tools for dealing with the Western United States’ water “crisis.”

v

Introduction
New Mexico, like many other states in the West, has a water shortage. Demand is
increasing as population increases, while supply is decreasing due to both climate change
and the nature of New Mexico’s water supply. One suggestion for dealing with the water
shortage has been that we use the traditional prior appropriations system. New Mexico’s
constitution makes temporal priority the basis for water administration, but in New
Mexico most water basins have not been adjudicated due to the costly and lengthy nature
of the adjudication process.
The New Mexico Legislature recognized all of this in January of 2003 when it
authorized the Office of the State Engineer (OSE) to promulgate Active Water Resource
Management (AWRM) regulations. The legislation gives the OSE explicit permission to
administer water rights in advance of adjudication in order to deal with the state’s water
shortage. Necessary tools for administration include a list of administrable rights and
metering to determine how much water is being used by each appropriator. General
regulations were finalized in December of 2004 and district specific regulations for seven
priority basins are currently in the process of being drafted (Hoffman, 2008).
One particularly interesting aspect of the AWRM regulations is the provision
allowing for alternative administration. Alternative administration contrasts with
traditional priority of right administration and is based on negotiated water sharing
agreements that can include shortage sharing agreements (New Mexico Statutes
Annotated (NMSA) §19.25.13.6.4). Historically, shortage sharing agreements have been
used by acequias in the state (O’Leary, 2004). Although implementation of the AWRM
regulations is on hold due to litigation, water sharing agreements have been worked out
and approved by the OSE in many priority basins, including the San Juan. A shortage
sharing agreement was also negotiated among some users in the Gallinas, but was not
approved by the OSE because it did not include all affected water users (Hoffman, 2008).
This paper answers three questions. First, what principles do successful water
sharing agreements share? Most research into water sharing agreements looks at
agreements between countries or U.S. interstate compacts. This is the starting point.

Second, do the same principles apply when looking at agreements among a small number
of water users under a single jurisdiction as apply when looking at agreements among
large state and federal actors? Finally, are local water sharing agreements1 a useful
overall addition to the system of water allocation in the West?
In order to address these questions, I specifically consider the example of one
local water sharing agreement in the San Juan River Basin in New Mexico. I chose the
San Juan Basin because it is the only agreement of its kind where users negotiated prior
to any litigation or action by a state agency. The other alternative administration
agreement in place is on the Pecos River, but that is based on the “Pecos Settlement
Agreement,” which was a result of litigation (OSE, 2006). Also useful for comparison
purposes would the proposed agreement in Gallinas River Basin, where approval was not
granted by the OSE. This was left out because of a lack of time and information.
My paper first considers the background of traditional priority administration and
water adjudications in the state of New Mexico, as well as the AWRM alternative, in
order to place the San Juan agreement in context. Second, it considers the large body of
research on what makes international and interstate agreements succeed or fail. Third, it
then distills the essential principles that can be applied to local water sharing agreements.
Finally, using these principles as a framework for analysis, it considers the San Juan
agreement.

1

For the purpose of this paper a local agreement will be defined as one among a limited number

of water rights holders all using a single water source and all located within a single state
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Chapter 1: New Mexico Context

Traditional Water Law in the State of New Mexico
It has been suggested that one strategy for dealing with New Mexico’s water
shortage is to start administering on the basis of the traditional prior appropriations
system. In order to consider why this may or may not work, it is useful to have a basic
knowledge of the traditional New Mexico water law. Water law in the state of New
Mexico, like other western states, is based on the doctrine of prior appropriation, or “first
in time first in right” (New Mexico Constitution, Article XVI, §2). This contrasts with
eastern states where water law is based on riparian rights which award water rights to the
owner or owners of the land adjacent to a water body.
Water rights in New Mexico are complicated by New Mexico’s long history of
European settlement. On January 6th, 1912, New Mexico adopted its constitution. It
states “All existing rights to the use of any waters in this state for any useful or beneficial
purpose are hereby recognized and confirmed” (New Mexico Constitution, Article XVI,
§1). This included rights granted to Pueblos and to Spanish settlers under Spanish law
starting in 1540, rights derived under Mexican law starting in 1824 and confirmed by the
Treaty of Guadalupe, Hidalgo in 1848, and rights granted between 1848 and 1912 when
New Mexico was a territory of the U.S (Hall, 2007). Article 16 §3 of the New Mexico
Constitution goes on to state that “beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the
limit of the right to use of water” (New Mexico Constitution, Article XVI, §3).
The water rights Article 16 considers are mostly surface water rights. Prior to the
adoption of the 1907 water code, a new water right was obtained by taking water and
applying it to beneficial use. The priority date of a surface water right relates back to the
time in which an appropriator took the first concrete steps to appropriate water. Since the
adoption of the 1907 water code, a permit has to be obtained from the OSE, then
necessary works constructed, and proof filed that the water is being put to beneficial use.
Finally applicants are supposed to file for a license, but few applicants actually take this
step. During this process the OSE determines if un-appropriated water exists, if the new
water right would prove detrimental to senior water rights holders, and if the new right is
3

against the public interest (NMSA, § 72.5.1, §72.5.7). In New Mexico, surface water is
over appropriated and there are no new surface water rights being approved (Hall, 2007).
New Mexico water law also covers rights to groundwater. Groundwater rights in
the state have always been governed by the law of prior appropriation (Yeo v. Tweedy,
1929). There exist two processes for acquiring a new groundwater right depending on
whether the basin is declared or undeclared. Most of the groundwater basins in New
Mexico are declared basins (NRCS, 2002). Inside a declared basin, an applicant must
apply to the OSE and must give notice. Prior to drilling the appropriator must prove that
there exists un-appropriated water and that his or her well will not impair existing wells.
The OSE also has a duty to protect existing rights. In an undeclared basin, an
appropriator is free to drill and get a right to water without the permission of the OSE.
The new appropriator can be sued by an existing water rights holder, but the burden of
proof is on the one suing to prove impairment (NMSA §72.4). Given all of the different
types of water rights claims on any given system, it is easy to see why water
adjudications are costly and lengthy. The purpose of adjudication is to establish validity
of a right and its elements such as priority date, volume, and uses allowed. An
adjudication must define the legal and hydrological interrelationship of: (1) Pre-1907
rights, (2) Post 1907 rights, (3) Pre-declared basin rights (in the case of groundwater), (4)
Post declared basin rights (in the case of groundwater), (5) Federal reserved rights, and
(6) Native American rights. In an adjudication, the plaintiff is the State of New Mexico
and the defendants are all of the water rights holders. Water rights are investigated using
aerial photographs, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and other means. Next, a
hydrographic survey determines the elements of each right: quantity, type of use, purpose
of use, and location of use. Then an offer of judgment with these elements listed is given
to each plaintiff. If the owner disagrees with his or her offer of judgment, then the case
goes to trial. If the owner agrees with his or her offer of judgment or after the trial, an
order is entered. After all the orders are entered, the court enters a partial final decree
confirming all prior orders. Next, during the inter-se portion of adjudication process,
individual water right holder can challenge each other over the elements of their water
rights (NMSA §72.4 / Hoffman, 2008). Adjudications have been completed for less
than 25 percent of the water rights in the State of New Mexico. As of 2007 there were
4

twelve ongoing adjudications in the state, some of which had been going on for decades
(Associated Press, November, 2007).

In 2007, “State Engineer John

D’Antonio…estimated it would cost $300 million over 55 years to settle all the claims on
New Mexico’s rivers and streams” (Ibid).
Active Water Rights Management in the State of New Mexico
In the many basins of the state that are not completely adjudicated, the State
Engineer does not have a list of administrable water rights to use as the basis for
administration.

Therefore, administering on the basis of the traditional prior

appropriations system is currently not a very useful tool to get a handle on New Mexico’s
water “crisis.” An alternative is needed. Active Water Resource Management (AWRM)
is an effort to administer water rights in the state of New Mexico in advance of
completion of the numerous costly and lengthy legal adjudications that are underway
throughout the state. When AWRM was authorized in 2003, the state legislature stated,
The legislature recognizes that the adjudication process is slow, the need for water
administration is urgent, compliance with the interstate compacts is imperative
and the state engineer has the authority to administer water allocations in
accordance with water right priorities recorded or declared or otherwise available
to the state engineer (NMSA§72.2.9.1A).
It charged the Office of the State Engineer (OSE) with adopting rules for priority
administration that would, “Ensure that authority is exercised: (1) so as not to interfere
with future or pending adjudications; (2) so as to create no impairment of water rights,
other than what is required to enforce priorities; and (3) so as to create no increased
depletions” (NMSA§72.2.9.1A). Additionally, the OSE was directed to adopt rules
based on appropriate hydrologic models and that allowed for expedited marketing and
leasing (NMSA§72.2.9.1A).
The 2003 legislation led to the promulgation of general regulations in December
of 2004 by the OSE. The OSE’s regulations state that the scope of the regulations is to
undertake the supervision of the physical distribution of water, to prevent waste, and to
administer the available supply of water by priority date or by alternative administration
as appropriate. These rules apply to all water rights within the state from all sources of
water, surface water and hydrologically connected groundwater (N.M. OSE 19.25.13
5

(2004)).
The regulations define an administrable water right as “A water right or right to
impound, store or release water, the elements of which had been determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction or determined on an interim basis by the state engineer under these
rules and regulations” ((N.M. OSE 19.25.13.2 (2004)). AWRM also includes efforts to
meter water rights. The general framework allows for four forms of administration which
can be combined based upon the unique circumstances of the district. The four forms are
(1) direct flow administration, (2) storage water administration; (3) depletion limited
administration, and (4) alternative administration. The first three of these are based on
temporal priority (N.M. OSE, 19.25.13.7 C (1-3) (2004)). The last, alternative
administration, is defined by the general regulations as,
administration that is based on a water sharing agreement among affected water
rights owners, and that is acceptable to the state engineer. Such administration
may include voluntary shortage sharing such as, but not limited to, percentage
division or pro rata allocation, rotation of water use, and reduced diversions (N.M.
OSE, 19.25.13.7 C (4) (2004)).
Existing agreements in place by acequias or community ditch associations are also
approved (Ibid).
AWRM has been controversial, with some water rights holders strongly objecting
to the legislation and subsequent regulations (Hoffman, 2008). The basic argument of
those that oppose the AWRM regulations is that it is unconstitutional for the State
Engineer to administer in advance of adjudications being completed in a court of law
(Hoffman, 2008). AWRM was challenged in court in 2005 by Tri-State Generation and
Transmission Association and the New Mexico Mining Association (OSE, 2007). In
May of 2007, “Judge Matthew Reynolds of the Seventh Judicial District issued a
ruling…that affirms the State Engineer’s Active Water Resource Management Rules and
Regulations” (OSE, 2007). Some of the specific regulations adopted were found to be
invalid.
The two parts invalidated were the list of documents that the State Engineer
would use to determine the elements of a water right for the purpose of
administration , and the procedure for hearing objections to the State Engineer’s
determinations (Utton Center, 2009, pg. 37).
However, the general principle that administration need not wait until adjudications had
6

been completed by the court system was upheld. The case was appealed to the Court of
Appeals by the OSE, who objected to the courts invalidating the certain procedures listed
above. Briefs have been submitted in the case (Utton Center, 2009, pg. 38).
While litigation is ongoing, the implementation of AWRM is proceeding. The
general framework is the basis for the promulgation of specific water master district rules
and regulations. The Office of the State Engineer (OSE) has selected seven priority
districts which are: (1) the Rio Chama Basin, (2) the Rio Gallinas Basin, (3) the Lower
Pecos Basin, (4) the Lower Rio Grande Basin, (5) the Rio Mimbris, (6) the NambePojoaque-Tesuque Stream System, and (7) the San Juan Basin. The promulgation of
district specific regulations, the creation of a list of administrable water rights, and
metering are proceeding at different rates in each district (Hoffman, 2008). Overall
AWRM is 80 percent completed in the seven priority basins (OSE, 2009).
The San Juan agreement is the only whose district specific regulations include a
negotiated water sharing agreement The San Juan agreement has a relatively long
history, being created prior even to the finalizing of the general regulations. It can serve
as a good case study on how local water sharing agreements work, and whether they can
be a model for other similar agreements in New Mexico or elsewhere.

7

Chapter 2: Interstate Agreements
To examine how an agreement like the one on the San Juan for success or failure
a set of criteria is needed. Although little research has been done on the process of
working out local area water sharing agreements, there is a rich body of literature on
sharing between countries and sharing between states. This literature includes analysis of
the existing interstate compacts, theoretical literature, and model water sharing codes
(McCormick, 1994, Draper, 2002, Muys, 2007, etc.). This paper will draw important
principles about how to share water from this body of literature and then apply them to
the San Juan River Basin agreement.
Interstate Compacts
The traditional model for water sharing across boundaries in the U.S. is the
interstate compact. Zachary McCormick (1994) reviewed the twenty-two Western
interstate compacts to see what had made them successful or unsuccessful. He also
examined what problems might arise in the future because of changing political and
physical environments. His analysis is useful in evaluating water sharing agreements that
cover all different area sizes. His definition of success is also instructive. He stated,
“For the purposes of this paper, a compact will be judged to be successful if the system of
allocation created by the compact has been maintained and operated without intervention
by the federal government or successful resort to federal power by one of the compacting
parties” (McCormick, 1994, pg. 3). Later in this paper I draw an analogy that is
appropriate for considering the success or failure of a small local water sharing
agreement. McCormick considered two main questions; “How is the water divided and is
that division still working between the states?” (McCormick, 1994, pg. 9)
Before launching into his review of interstate compacts, McCormick briefly
considers the strengths and weaknesses of the three methods used to allocate water
between states. The first method is Congressional legislation, which is allowed under
Congress’s power over navigation and commerce (McCormick, 1994). This method has
only been used twice due to the reluctance by Congress to address situations that are both
highly technical and sticky politically (McCormick, 1994)). More frequently, disputes
8

over interstate water issues result in ligation. “In fact litigation before the Supreme Court
has been referred to as a substitute for war. If states were independent and could not
agree on a treaty, they might go to war. That course of action being blocked, they litigate
instead” (McCormick, 1994, pg. 18). These cases are decided under the principles of
equitable apportionment making it difficult to predict how they will turn out. “The
outcome of the suit in equity may turn on who can make the most persuasive case to the
particular court. That in turn often involves a balancing of perceived benefit to one party
against the perceived harm to another” (McCormick, 1994). The litigation process is
highly uncertain, lengthy, and costly, making ligation a less than ideal method of solving
water conflicts.
The compact process is the third option for solving water conflicts, and it is
allowed under the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution. “No State shall without the
consent of Congress…enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a
foreign power.” (U.S. Constitution: Article I, §3). After reviewing the 22 Western
interstate compacts, McCormick concludes his thesis with several recommendations,
most of which are relevant to small local water sharing agreements. The first of these is
that because compacts vary in their historical and geographic contexts, the administration
of the compact must vary accordingly (McCormick, 1994). This principle of flexibility is
important when it comes to creating local agreements tailored to the unique needs of an
individual water basin. The second recommendation McCormick makes is that the
degree of monitoring and active administration needed depends to a large extent on how
much water and how many states are involved. More formal administration is needed
where more water and/or a greater number of states are involved. If the compact or
agreement involves more than just the diversion of water (for instance, if issues of water
quality are involved), a more formal administrative structure may also be an advantage.
McCormick’s second recommendation suggests that a local water sharing agreement may
not need a large formal administrative structure. McCormick’s third recommendation
concerns how disputes are resolved under compact agreements (McCormick, 1994).
Mechanisms for dispute resolution are critical to the success of any agreement, whether
the agreement covers a large or small area. McCormick lays out four different
mechanisms for dispute resolution. These are; (1) majority vote, (2) casting vote, (3)
9

arbitration, and (4) litigation (McCormick, 1994):
The first three require a surrender of state power to some compact authority or
third person. In matters affecting so vital a resource as water, states may be
loathe to cede control and the scarcer the water, the more difficult it may be to
obtain such a concession. Water users who lose water as a result of such third
party decisions are likely to feel sold out by state government (McCormick, 1994,
pg. 292).
Majority vote only works when more than two states are involved. A “casting vote”
involves a federal representative who votes as a tie breaker if need be. This option
transfers more power to the federal government and may have political fallout for the
federal representative or agency involved. The third option, arbitration, involves a
neutral arbitrator who makes a decision based upon law and evidence. This option is
quicker and less costly than litigation, but may be less politically acceptable. Its results
must also be enforced. McCormick recommends using either arbitration or litigation as
the method of dispute resolution. His third recommendation is that compacts include
groundwater due to the problems that arise if they do not. He discusses how initially
most interstate compacts were negotiated when the relationship between surface water
and groundwater was not as well understood as it is today. As a result most compacts
cover surface water only and this has created problems with groundwater pumping
contributing to a decrease in surface water flows. McCormick’s recommendation may or
may not have relevance for local agreements depending on the hydrological
circumstances of the basin. His fourth recommendation is that compacts are more
successful when negotiated in advance of a water crisis. This principle is also likely true
on a local level but given current “crisis” level conditions in Western water, negotiations
truly in advance may not be possible for the type of local agreements this paper
considers. His fifth recommendation is that compacts allow for periodic modification
(McCormick, 1994). In the case of local agreements, periodic modification may be
easier. Finally, McCormick discusses methods of water allocation, and concludes that
“there is no right or wrong way to allocate water” (McCormick, 1994, pg. 300). Again
flexibility is important, and this principle applies to agreements covering both large and
small areas.
Work such as McCormick’s on what has made past water sharing agreements
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successful or unsuccessful led to more theoretical work on what should be in water
sharing agreements. The next section discusses the details of two model agreements, one
by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and one by the Utton Center for
Transboundary Resources, and the general principles that can be derived from these
agreements.
Model Agreements: Utton Center Model
The first model agreement considered was put together by the Utton Center for
Transboundary Resources at the University of New Mexico.2 The Center began drafting
the Model Compact in 2004 (Muys, et. al., 2007). The Center first conducted a literature
review in order (1) “to identify and evaluate the asserted strengths and weaknesses of the
use of compacts to resolve interstate water conflicts” (Muys, et. al., 2007, pg. 22), and (2)
to review the language of all the existing compacts to see how they addressed critical
issues. The practical administration of the compact was looked at by surveying the
interstate water compact commissions. An advisory committee of professionals in
different fields met in March of 2005 to make recommendations for inclusion in the
Model Compact. A working draft of the Model Compact was completed by Utton Center
staff and went through several revisions based on suggestions by the advisory committee.
The final version of the Model Compact was completed in 2006 (Muys, et. al., 2007).
The Utton Center Model Compact starts out with a preamble stating the strong
foundation on which the compact is based. The section is important to an agreement
because it provides common understanding for the different parties. The stronger the
common understanding, the more likely the agreement is to succeed. The preamble also
lays out the need for parties to negotiate in good faith, and acknowledges the need for the
compact to be consistent with the existing federal and state legal framework (Muys, et.
al., 2007). Both the need for a common ground and the need for a consistent legal
framework are also important for local water sharing agreements.
Article I of the Model Compact covers the compact purposes, water subject to the
compact and signatory parties. According to Muys, et. al. 2007, the purpose of this

2

Referred to in the rest of this paper as either the Utton Center or the Center.

11

Model Compact:
is to respond to the Supreme Court’s repeated admonishment to contesting states
that the negotiation of their respective “equitable shares” of interstate regional
water resources and resolution of other disputes regarding such resources is a far
better approach than a judicially imposed “equitable apportionment” or other
judicial decree (Muys, et. al., 2007, pg. 27).
This purpose is very broad but also very clear. The commentary by Muys, et. al., 2007
acknowledges that compacts can also be used for more limited purposes like flood
control, water quality protection, or just water allocation. The purpose of a local
agreement is likely to be more limited; however, clarity about the agreement’s purposes
is important for all different sizes of agreements. The water subject to the compact is that
of “surface water flows and hydrologically connected subsurface waters of the Utton
River and its tributary water bodies within the states of A, B, and C” (Muys, et. al., 2007,
pg. 27). This reflects the belief among the advisory committee and other water
professionals that related groundwater must be included in compact allocations of surface
water flows. Finally the signatory parties to the compact include all of those affected by
the compact, including the states, the U.S. government, and Native American tribes in
those states (Muys, et al., 2007). Both the inclusion of any related groundwater and the
inclusion of all parties affected by an agreement in the negotiating process are points that
are important to local agreements.
Article II of the compact covers its more procedural aspects. There is a waiver of
U.S. sovereign immunity if the U.S. is a signatory party. This is likely irrelevant to local
area agreements. Unlike many existing compacts, the Model Compact has a sunset
provision in which the agreement is set to expire in twenty five years if not renewed by
the parties in some fashion. The compact can not be terminated unless existing financial
obligations of the Commission are satisfied, water rights are preserved, and
environmental protection obligations are also met. This sunset provision allows for
flexibility, but also increases uncertainty.

Individual signatory parties are also allowed

to withdraw if they give two years notice to the other parties, and the financial, water
rights, and environmental protection obligations are all met (Muys, et. al., 2007).
exact duration of an agreement should be an element covered by small local water
sharing agreements.
12

The

Article III of the Model Compacts is a definition section. This is a very common
element in interstate water compacts. The use of clear and common definitions and
terminology help the signatory parties to be on the same page, which in turn helps the
compact succeed. There are two common approaches to providing the needed definitions
(Muys, et. al., 2007). According to Muys, et. al., 2007,
One approach is to include a long list of compact terms and definitions of these
terms. The alternative approach is to include relatively few definitions and to
authorize whatever administrative entity is created by the compact to define
additional terms as needed (Muys, et. al., 2007, pg. 39).
The Utton Center Model Compact (in contrast to the ASCE model code that will be
discussed in the next section of this paper) takes the second of these two approaches. It
includes only sixteen definitions, which are related both to the governance structure, and
scientific and technical terminology related to the compacts application (Muys, et. al.
2007). If a definitions section is included in a smaller local agreement, then a more
succinct approach with fewer definitions is probably all that is needed. The important
principle is that all parties share a common language to communicate.
Article IV of the Model Compact establishes the administrative structure for the
compact. Because this compact covers both a large area and a broad set of purposes, its
administrative structure is relatively complex. This is more extensive than something
that would be needed for a local agreement whose purpose is more limited. Article IV
sets up a three part system in which an Utton River Basin Commission is supported by a
Council and a Division of Scientific Analysis to which “certain authorities and
responsibilities are delegated” (Muys, et. al., 2007, pg. 41). The Members of the
Commission are the governors of states A, B, and C, a single tribal representative
representing all the tribes in the basin, and a federal representative. These members
represent the key players in the basin and at least in the case of the governors are of a
sufficiently high level to have decision making authority.

The Utton Center’s literature

review indicated that many existing compacts did not grant sufficient authority to the
compact commissions. In response the Advisory Committee helping to draft the Model
Compact “made it clear that the Commission needed powers broad enough to accomplish
the purposes of the Compact” (Muys, et. al., 2007, pg. 50) and “sufficient discretion,
authority and flexibility to respond to changing conditions” (Muys, et. al. 2007, pg. 50),
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like drought and climate change (Muys, et. al., 2007). The Council, the second structure
set up by Article IV, consists of high ranking administrators from the signatory states,
tribes, and a federal representative, all from agencies managing water allocation and
water quality. The Council implements the Water Quality Protection Program and the
Water Resource Programs, performs other day to day duties, and carries out the decisions
of the Commission (Muys, et. al., 2007). This structure allows for the Commission to
concentrate on the large overarching issues and not get bogged down in the smaller
program details. It also elevates the role of administrators by giving them some policy
making responsibility. The Division, the third administrative piece set up by Article IV,
is responsible for providing multidisciplinary scientific and technical support to the
Commission and the Council. The inclusion of the Division elevates the importance of
science in the operation of the compact (Muys, et. al., 2007).
Article V of the Model Compact is its most important article, and discusses how
water is to be allocated annually amongst the different states. According to Muys, et. al,
2007,
Article V rests on several important basic premises. First is that adequate stream
flows should be maintained in each state in the Basin to provide a healthy
ecosystem, without which any long-term allocation and management agreement
could be doomed to recurrent conflict or failure. Second is that existing rights in
each state at the time of compact execution should be protected to the extent that
they have been perfected under state or federal law (Muys, et. al. 2007, pg. 64).
The amount of water needed to satisfy both the healthy ecosystem requirements and
perfected water rights is determined during the compact negotiations and comprises the
“base apportionment” level. Any excess additional water would be considered a
“supplemental apportionment” (Muys, et. al., 2007). “The water supply premise of the
Model Compact is that ‘safe annual yield’ of the Basin is more than adequate to satisfy
the two components” (Muys, et. al., 2007). This is likely an unrealistic assumption in
many situations in the Western United States. When future supply is less, Article V
authorizes the Commission to “to make appropriate equitable reductions of the perfected
use rights of the base apportionment” (Muys, et. al., 2007). The shortage is shared under
a model compact agreement. This is analogous to the kind of water sharing and shortage
sharing that might occur under a small local agreement. Article V also clearly states
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that intra-state allocation among water users is left up to the individual states, which fits
with other provisions in the Model Compact that state the compact must fit within an
existing legal framework. Finally, Article V discusses reasonable beneficial use.
Members of the advisory committee argued that a beneficial use standard should be
clearly defined and more aggressively enforced in order for there to be “new water” for
environmental uses and an expanding population. The states would be responsible for
enforcing the recommended standard within their own state, but the Commission could
act if there was a complaint against one signatory party by another (Muys, et. al., 2007).
After a notice and hearing the Commission could:
be authorized to gradually reduce the wasting state’s apportionment by the
amount of water that could reasonably have been conserved by enforcement of the
recommended guidelines and reapportion it to the complaining party and other
states or parties (Muys, et. al., 2007, pg. 75).
While this part of the Model Compact would be controversial, parties may prefer it
to having an equitable apportionment action brought in the Supreme Court.
The next article of the Model Compact, Article VI, covers the creation of a Water
Quality Protection Program, which would be implemented by the Council. Water
quality, like water quantity, is also a transboundary issue, and thus it makes sense that it
would also be covered by a very broad compact. Depending on the purposes of a small
local agreement, a provision about water quality may or may not be needed. Inclusion of
water quality issues helps makes the Model Compact truly comprehensive.
Article VII covers the creation of a Water Resource Management Program. It
requires that within two years of the Compact becoming effective, the parties submit to
the Commission estimates for water demands, different projects, and categories of uses
for a five year period as well as estimating water supply, both existing and supplemental
(Muys, et. al., 2007). Then,
Based upon such submittals, the Commission shall develop a basin wide water
resource management program establishing construction or implementation
priorities for the components of the state’s proposed programs and possible
alternatives to certain components (Muys, et. al., 2007, pg. 83).
The Model Compact also gives the Commission the responsibility of approving or
rejecting all new major projects, surface diversions, subsurface water extractions, and
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water transfers to make sure they are accordance with the water management program.
Additionally there are provisions for the construction and operation of projects designed
to reduce or prevent flood damage. The main goal of this part of the Model Compact is
to engage in coordination of regional supply and demand planning in order to more
optimally utilize existing and new water supplies in the basin to meet existing and future
water demands (Muys, et. al., 2007). This would be done via exercising a “review and
approval authority” (Muys, et. al., 2007, pg. 86) over new projects rather than the
Commission taking the lead in developing a binding comprehensive plan (Muys, et. al.,
2007). While this kind of water planning is useful over a larger area, it is not necessary
when it comes to a local water sharing agreements.
Articles IX, Interagency Coordination and Public Participation, and Article X,
Budgeting and Financing, are other aspects of the broad Utton Center Model Compact
which would not be applicable to a local water sharing agreement. Article IX, dealing
with interagency coordination and public participation, provides additional guidance as to
what form the administrative structure surrounding the agreement should be. The three
divisions, Commission, Council, and Division, are all responsible for maintaining contact
with their respective constituencies. Article IX also sets up a multi-interest, multidisciplinary Advisory Committee to give advice to both the Commission and the Council,
and sets out the method by which the Commission should report its activities to the
general public (Muys, et. al., 2007). As stated in the discussion of Article IV above, the
administrative needs of a local water sharing agreement are likely to be less extensive
than that of larger area water sharing agreements, and therefore the provisions of Article
IX would likely be irrelevant. Article X sets up a process for financing and cost sharing
for infrastructure development, and thus would be irrelevant for a local water sharing
agreement that is not completing any infrastructure development projects (Muys, et. al.,
2007).
Article VIII sets out an extensive multi-step process by which the compact will be
enforced and disputes resolved (Muys, et. al., 2007). Dispute resolution principles are
relevant to any type of agreement where conflict may arise. The resolution procedures
are designed to give the Commission “adequate authority to enforce the Compact
obligations against the signatory parties and to resolve disputes under the Compact”
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(Muys, et. al., 2007, pp. 92-93). This is done so that the principal purpose of the
Compacts, “to avoid interstate litigation in the Supreme Court (Muys, et. al., 2007, pg.
92),” can be achieved (Muys, et. al., 2007).

One of the problems with many western

water compacts is that they “require unanimity of the signatory parties for official
action….thus conferring a veto power in a single state” (Muys, et. al., 2007), and
allowing a single party to block enforcement of the compact. This also gives upstream
states a clear advantage over downstream states, because they can theoretically use water
before it reaches downstream states while blocking enforcement of the compact against
them. The downstream states are forced to resort to costly interstate litigation in the
Supreme Court, which is exactly what the Model Compact seeks to avoid. Additionally
the second part of Article VIII makes seeking resolution before the Commission
mandatory before initiating litigation. The penalty for not doing so is that the party
would have to pay all the litigation cost of any parties involved in future litigation on the
subject of the dispute (Muys, et. al., 2007). While the process for a local water sharing
agreement would likely involve fewer steps and take less time, the same general principle
of negotiation before litigation should still apply.
The last article of the Utton Center Model Compact that I will discuss is Article
XI which covers the relationship of the Utton Center Model Compact to existing state,
federal, and treaty law. Article XI, Section 1, states that
except as expressly preserved herein or in the congressional legislation consenting
to this Compact, any present or future state or tribal laws or regulations that are
irreconcilably inconsistent with any provision of this Compact are superseded by
such Compact provisions (Muys, et. al., 2007, pg. 107).
This is consistent with compacts being laws of the United States once they have been
ratified by Congress, and thus under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
superseding inconsistent states laws unless otherwise stated. The provision relating to
existing federal laws is similarly stated. All applicable federal laws must be followed by
the Commission, Council, and Division of Scientific Analysis. Applicable federal laws
include the National Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
and the Administrative Procedures Act, as well as other laws relating to financial
disclosure, open meetings, advisory committees, judicial review, etc. The Model
Compact also states that any interstate water allocations by the Supreme Court the Model
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Compact expressly states otherwise or the Commission votes unanimously to change the
water allocation(s) (Muys, et. al., 2007). The relationship of a local water sharing
agreements to existing laws is obviously going to be different. Local water sharing
agreements must fit within the existing legal framework or risk being challenged on the
basis of state or federal laws that supersede them.
The Model Compact by the Utton Center covers a wide range of purposes and a
large geographic area and so contains many provisions that are inapplicable or would
need to be tweaked in order to apply to a local water sharing agreement. The provisions
that are irrelevant in whole include Article VI (unless a small local water sharing
agreement wants to deal with water quality), Article VII (the creation of an extensive
Water Resource Management Program), Article IX (Interagency Coordination and Public
Participation), and Article X (Budgeting and Financing). The extensive administration of
the Utton Center as laid out by some of the procedural elements of Article II and Article
IV, is more complex than what is needed for a small local water sharing agreement. The
next model I will consider is narrower in its scope.
Model Agreements: ASCE Model
The second model water code considered was put together by the American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). In 1995, the ASCE initiated the Shared Use of
Water Resources (SUTWR) project.
The purpose of the project was to review trans-boundary agreements and develop
a model agreement for utilization of water by sovereign governments or sub units
within sovereign nations. The model agreement was focused on the allocation
and use of shared waters and the resolution of conflicts involving such waters
(Draper, 2002, pg. iii).
The ASCE’s process for drafting its Model Code was similar to that used by Utton Center
for its 2006 Model Compact Model Agreement. Stephen E. Draper chaired the working
group drafting the Model Code and later edited a book outlining the three model codes
the working group developed (Draper, 2002). There were three model codes, because
early on “the committee recognized that the degree to which Parties were willing to
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relinquish sovereign control of water resources depended on the hydrologic,
geographical, and political situation” (Draper, 2002, pg. v). The models developed were;
Model A (Coordination and Cooperation), Model B (Limited Purpose), and Model C
(Comprehensive Management) (Draper 2002).
Model B (Limited Purpose) is concerned with water management needs that are
limited in scope. It is a model wherein the Parties enter into an agreement to
achieve certain limited purposes. The willingness to concede authority of
management of internal water resources is limited to what is necessary to achieve
a specific goal. The limited purpose goals may vary from simple allocation of
water released from a single reservoir, to prioritization of needs during droughts,
to other issues such as water quality (Draper, 2002, pg. vi).
Of the three model agreements, Model B most closely resembles the circumstances of a
local water sharing agreement and will be examined in more detail.
Article I of the ACSE’s Model B agreement declares the purposes and policies of
the agreement. It covers similar ground to the Preamble and Article I of Utton Center
Model Compact. The scope of the agreement is limited to certain specified purpose or
purposes and to a particular water basin. The agreement also makes clear whether
groundwater is covered (Draper, 2002). From this part of the model agreement we can
draw the principle that water sharing agreements should be very clear about what they
cover (both purpose wise and geographically) If an agreements is not clear on these
points, interpretation of the agreement in the future will be muddied, and implementation
will falter.

Article I also covers the duty of the parties to the agreement to coordinate

and cooperate in good faith, despite the fact that all parties enter into agreements with
their own self interest in mind. Successful agreements are ones in which all parties
operate with good faith intentions and agree to follow certain principles in the
management of water (Draper, 2002). Finally, Article I contains two provisions that are
optional depending on the circumstances of a particular agreement. One provision covers
the need to preserve federal rights, and a national security provision for use in
international agreements (Draper, 2002). Obviously neither of these will apply in a local
water sharing agreement.
Article II of the ASCE Model B Agreement covers some of its procedural
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provisions. First, Article II covers how long the agreement is going to be in effect.
When selecting a duration for an agreement, there are two important principles to be
considered. The first of these is that a longer time period gives greater predictability for
resource development. On the other hand, a longer time period makes the agreement
less flexible, which may hurt the agreement when there are significant changes in
climate, hydrology, water demand, or water technology in the future.

Article II also

outlines specific procedures for amending and/or supplementing the agreement.
Amending or supplementing an agreement may be needed if an agreement fails to operate
as well as initially intended. Amending or supplementing (in the case of an interstate
compact) may also trigger the need for congressional re-approval of the agreement.
Next, Article II contains a limited applicability provision. This provision says that if one
provision of the agreement is found to be null in a court, then the entire agreement
doesn’t become void. Finally, Article II says that annexes to the agreement that contain
procedural information are part of the agreement, and gives definitions for the various
terms found in the agreement. The definition section contains mostly physical and not
administrative definitions (Draper, 2002). Of these procedural elements, the only ones
with direct applicability to a local water sharing agreement are those that deal with
selecting a duration for the agreement and procedures for amending the agreement.
Article III of the ASCE’s Model Code B concerns the administrative provisions of
the code. The first part of Article III covers administrative officials. Administration
relies on the use of the existing water officials of the two parties. Since Model Code B is
limited in its purposes and scope, there is no need for a complicated and extensive
administrative structure, such as that used in the Utton Center Model Compact. The first
part of Article III provides a minimal means of administering. The two parties are
obligated to provide administrative and technical support as needed to implement the
agreement. Funding mechanisms are also covered and depend on the complexity of the
agreement (Draper, 2002). “In the case of simple allocation agreements in which no
commission is established, funding provisions are not normally included” (Draper, 2002).
This kind of diffused and limited administrative structure is similar to what would be
needed by a local limited purpose agreement. Part II of Article III contains some
provisions which are not applicable to local water sharing agreements. For example, “To
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achieve efficient use of allocated water it may be desirable to construct reservoirs or other
works within the boundaries of the other Party” (Draper, 2002, pg. 58). This could lead to
conflicts with the sovereignty of the other party within its own territory. Part II of Article
III attempts to smooth over conflicts in advance. In the case of international agreements,
navigation is also covered (Draper, 2002).
Like in the Utton Center Model, the most important provision, Article IV, covers
how best to allocate water. Is the allocation to be based on the relative geographic areas
of the two parties, on the relative contributions of their water ways, on existing uses, or to
be divided in half, etc.? In his discussion of Article IV, Draper agrees with McCormick
that how water is best allocated depends in part on the unique circumstances of the
particular agreement.

This again has applicability to local water sharing agreements.

Also related is the first part of the ASCE's Model Code B Article IV, covering exclusive
jurisdiction and control. “This provision establishes the principle of the sovereign right of
each Party to allocate or otherwise utilize and control the waters within its borders,
constrained only by the requirement that such use be reasonable and equitable” (Draper,
2002, pg. 62). Article IV also looks at water level protection, flood protection works,
information sharing, how hydraulically connected groundwater is to be dealt with, and
the importance of water quality in addition to water quantity (Draper, 2002).
The last article of the ASCE”s Model Code B, Article V, specifically deals with
the question of dispute resolution.
Disputes will inevitably arise as the Agreement is implemented. These disputes
may involve differences in interpretation of the Agreement’s provisions or
noncompliance with the Agreement itself. The disputes may also arise because of
the changing conditions that alter the effectiveness of the Agreement for one or
more of the Parties. While a speedy and equitable process of Dispute Resolution
serves all parties well, some sovereign entities do not wish to enter into an
obligatory process. In such a case, Article 5B must be omitted. In other instances
Parties may recognize the need to institutionalize a dispute resolution process
(Draper, 2002, pp. 69-70).
Article V first encourages peaceful informal negotiations and consultation between the
two parties. It then outlines that the parties have a clear right to litigation (if there is an
appropriate judicial body) if peaceful negotiations and consultations fail (Draper, 2002).
The same principles of peaceful negotiations, followed by resort to litigation, apply in the
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case of local water sharing agreements, although the first venue of resort may be a state
administrative agency and not the court system.
General Principles for Water Sharing Agreements
As shown by the discussion of the literature on existing interstate compacts and
on the two model agreements, there are many general principles that can be derived from
the literature on interstate compacts and model water sharing agreements that cover a
large area. These can then be applied to local water sharing agreements. They are listed
in Table 1 below, and then explained in more detail.

Table 1: Water Sharing Principles for Large Area and Small Local Agreements
Category/Subcategory (if
applicable)

Principles over a Large Area

Administrative
Structure: Clarity

Must be clear with delineated
responsibilities

Analogy to a Local Area Agreement
Must be clear with delineated
responsibilities. Parties must share a
common language in order to be able to
communicate

Administrative
Structure: Size

Appropriate size to accomplish
the job

Local agreements may not need a formal
administrative structure in place

Administrative
Structure: Legality

Agreements must fit with an
applicable legal framework

Local agreements should have the backing of
a larger legal structure

Comprehensiveness:
Included Parties

All affected parties must have a
voice at the table

All affected parties must have a voice at the
table
Groundwater and surface water as applicable

Comprehensiveness:
Science

Groundwater and Surface water
Agreements must be based on a
good understanding of hydrology,
etc.

Management
Purposes
Management
Purposes: Water
Allocation

Varies but needs to be clearly
stated
Several different methods can be
used based upon the unique
circumstances of the situation

Dispute Resolution:
Resolution Procedure

Negotiation First, Followed by
Option for Resort to Litigation

Definition of Success

Maintained and Operated without
intervention by the federal
government

Comprehensiveness:
Included Water
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Agreements must be based on a good
understanding of hydrology, etc.
Varies but needs to be clearly stated
Several different methods can be used based
upon the unique circumstances of the basin
Negotiation First, Followed by Option to
Resort to State Agency, Then Resort to
Litigation
Maintained and Operated without Resort to a
Traditional Priority Administration System
that would leave junior appropriators without
water

The first category of principles that are relevant for larger area agreements is
principles related to administrative structure include in the agreement. The same
principles apply to local area agreements. The first of these is clarity, which is stressed in
numerous places throughout McCormick, 1994, the Utton Center Model Compact, and
the ASCE’s Model Code B. The second administrative principle has to do with the size
of the organization. The literature suggests that the appropriate size depends on how
much water is being managed, the purpose for which the water is being managed, and
how large a geographic area is included. This is illustrated in McCormick’s
recommendations, and in Article II of the ASCE’s Model Code B. Smaller local
agreements likely will not need an extensive administrative structure. Additionally
parties must share a common vocabulary for communication. For water sharing
agreements that cover a large area, this might take the form of a formal definitions
section, but for a local area agreement this may happen more informally. Definitions are
covered in the appendix to the ASCE’s Model Code B, and in Article III of the Utton
Center’s Model Compact. The final administrative principle is legality. Agreements
must fit within an applicable legal framework. Smaller agreements must have the
backing of a larger legal structure. The importance of this is illustrated most clearly in
Article XI of the Utton Center Model Compact.
The second category of principles that applies to larger area water sharing
agreements relates to the need for the agreement to be comprehensive. The first of these
is that all affected parties must have a voice at the negotiating table. The second is that
both surface and groundwater must be included. The connection between groundwater
and surface water is recognized in McCormick’s recommendation, as well as in the first
article of both model agreements/compacts. Third, all agreements must be based on
sound science.

The importance of science is related to the need to include

hydrologically related groundwater, but is also illustrated by the Utton Center Model
Compact’s setting up a science division as part of the administrative structure laid out in
Article IV.
The third category of principles is the management purpose or purposes of an
agreement. According to the literature the management purposes can vary depending on
the particular circumstances, but need to be clearly stated. Management purposes also
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cover how water is to be allocated by the agreement. In a larger area agreement this may
be outlined in very broad strokes only, with details regulated to an appendix. For a local
area agreement this may form the bulk of the agreement document.

Management

purposes, chiefly water allocation procedures, are covered in Article V of the Utton
Center Model Compact, and Article IV of the ASCE’s Model Code B. McCormick’s
recommendations also stress the importance of tailoring the water allocation procedures
in a basin to the needs and physical realities of that particular basin.
The fourth category of principles deals with the amount of flexibility present in
any given agreement. The first of these principles has to do with the duration of the
agreement. The literature discusses a tension between agreements that are flexible
enough to respond to changing climatic and hydrologic realities, but stable enough to
provide some consistency so water users know what to expect especially where large
investments are being made in water infrastructure (Muys, et. al., 2007 / Draper, 2002).
In the case of a local area agreement, the need for large investments in water
infrastructure development is arguably less of an issue. Given a smaller number of water
users over a smaller area, it is also easier for the parties to renegotiate their agreement on
a more frequent basis. Finally it is also important for parties to be able to think “outside
the box” to ensure that everyone gets the water they need. More novel solutions may be
more easily employed at the local level.
The next to last category of principles is dispute resolution. The type of
resolution procedure used will vary from agreement to agreement, but some general rules
apply. Both the ASCE Model Code B and the Utton Center Model Compact, try to put in
place mechanisms by which parties can negotiate first before they resort to litigation.
Article VIII of the Utton Center Model Compact and Article V of ASCE’s Model Code B
both reflect this emphasis. Similarly local area agreements can have mechanisms by
which parties can negotiate before resorting to intervention by a state agency or to
litigation. The last category is how we define success. When he looked at interstate
compacts, McCormick, 1994 defined success as when the compact had been maintained
and operated without intervention by the federal court system (McCormick, 1994). An
analogous definition for success for local water sharing agreements in the Western United
States is: The agreement allows the parties to not have to resort to a traditional priority
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administration that would leave junior appropriators without a significant portion of their
water under drought conditions.
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Chapter 4: Case Study of Shortage Sharing in the San Juan Basin

Basin Setting
The San Juan River “is located in the northwest corner of New Mexico and
extends into Colorado, Utah, and Arizona” (ISC, 2003, Section 1: Executive Summary,
pg. 1). In New Mexico it flows through San Juan County and Rio Arriba County. It is
also a tributary to the Colorado River. The San Juan River Basin is somewhat unique in
New Mexico, in that it is one of the few basins where only a small percentage of the
water used in the basin is groundwater (ISC, 2003).
Water rights in the basin are held by agricultural users, industrial users (mostly
power plants), municipal users, as well as by the Navajo Nation and the Jicarilla Apache
Nation. Like in the rest of New Mexico, the most senior rights are likely held by Native
American tribes, followed by agricultural users, followed by industrial and municipal
users. The water rights adjudication process, however, is still ongoing (ISC, 2003). The
area was partially adjudicated in 1948 in the Echo Ditch Decree. This partial
adjudication, however, was inadequate The adjudication did not include Native
American Water Rights, Federal Reserved Rights for federal projects that developed
later, and private water rights after 1938 (ISC, 2003). In 1975, the Echo Ditch Decree
began to be “re-evaluated in a pending action, which ultimately will involve an estimated
8,000 water users” (ISC, 2003, Section 6: Legal Issues, pg. 5). ). As of 2003 all of the
Jicarilla Apache rights had been quantified and the State was negotiating with the Navajo
Nation; however little had been done in the way of quantifying non-Native American
water rights (ISC, 2003). This is the status of water rights in the basin that existed around
the time the first San Juan River Operations and Administration agreement was
negotiated. There are also several interstate compacts, including the Colorado River
Compact that affect water administration in the basin (ISC, 2003).
History/Background
In 2003 there was a water “crisis” brewing among users of the San Juan River in
New Mexico. During 2002 and the winter of 2003 there had been extreme drought
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conditions. Water levels in Navajo Reservoir were low and there were many competing
needs for water. Priority administration was likely imminent. Most likely to be cut off
due to their junior priority status were power plants and the City of Farmington, New
Mexico. This sense of crisis drove the initial development of a water sharing agreement
(OSE, 2003).

In June of 2003 major water users on the San Juan River in New Mexico

developed recommendations and principles for how the waters of the San Juan were to be
divided (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration 2007 and
2008, 2006). Nine water users, including Bloomfield Irrigation District, Hammond
Conservancy District, Farmer’s Mutual Ditch, Jewett Valley Ditch, Public Service
Company of New Mexico, Arizona Public Service Company, BHP Billiton, Jicarilla
Apache Nation, and the Navajo Nation, endorsed the recommendations. The Navajo
Nation was speaking for its three irrigation projects (Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, the
Fruitland Irrigation Project, and the Hogback Irrigation Project) (OSE, 2003). “The City
of Farmington also endorsed the agreement” (OSE, 2003). Similar agreements have been
made on a year by year basis since, with the exception of the most recent agreement
which was a two year agreement covering both 2007 and 2008. The latest agreement is
entitled “Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007
and 2008” (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration 2007
and 2008, 2006).
The provisions of the San Juan agreement will first be summarized and then
discussed in more detail below as they pertain to the principles for success listed in
Chapter 3. Sections I, III, and V in particular will be covered in more detail. Section I of
the agreement covers the water demand for specific project or uses. Section I also states
“the diversion demand amounts and rates in Table 1 are negotiated values that take into
consideration differing opinions of the parties as to the demands and rights to divert water
under existing conditions” (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and
Administration 2007 and 2008, 2006, pg. 2). Those amounts are to be recognized only for
implementation during 2007 and 2008, and are not considered quantifications of water
rights (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration 2007 and
2008, 2006). Section II of the agreement covers the procedure by which the Bureau of
Reclamation (BOR) will determine the quantity of water to be released from Navajo
27

Dam, taking into account the diversion demands of Section I, and a target minimum flow
for environmental purposes. Section III covers shortage determination and sharing.
Section IV covers agreements to transfer or broker water between parties. Section V
covers dispute resolution. Section VI covers cooperative activities with the BOR.
Section VIII is a waiver of liability. Lastly section VII is statement of endorsement and
gives additional terms of the agreement, while Section IX lists endorsing parties to the
recommendations (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration
2007 and 2008, 2006). Available as an addendum to the agreement are documents of
endorsement by all nine parties, as well as letters from the New Mexico State Engineer
and the BOR.
Principles for Successes in the San Juan Agreement: Administrative Structure
The administrative structure involved in the San Juan agreement is minimal and
diffused. There is nobody whose sole job it is to work on the agreement. The major
users come together every year to negotiate the agreement with the assistance of basin
manager John Whipple (Hoffman, 2008, Whipple, January 23rd, 2008). Necessary dam
releases are computed by the BOR in accordance with what is needed by the agreement.
The BOR, OSE, and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) also assist with their technical and
administrative resources, including completing tasks such as calculating whether there is
a shortage or not and assisting in the resolution of disputes. The assistance of these
outside technical and administrative resources from federal and state agencies is likely
critical to the smooth functioning of the agreement. State and federal agencies can be
seen as fairly neutral arbitrators, able to make technical calculations (like probable
shortage calculations in the case of the BOR) about key issues. This kind of minimal and
diffused structure is appropriate given that the agreement only covers nine water users on
one body of water within one state (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and
Administration 2007 and 2008, 2006). The San Juan water sharing agreement is also
backed up by a larger legal structure. Under the 2003 AWRM Management statute,
discussed in Chapter 1, these kind of negotiated water agreements are allowed as an
alternative to priority administration. The agreement also makes clear that the negotiated
amounts hold only for the years covered by the agreement and are not binding on any
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future legal proceedings over water rights (Recommendations for San Juan River
Operations and Administration 2007 and 2008, 2006).
Principles for Success in the San Juan Agreement: Comprehensiveness
The San Juan agreement includes the nine major water users on the river,
including power companies, ditch users, the City of Farmington, and two tribal nations.
Additionally, “the endorsing parties waive no rights with regards to non-endorsing water
users in 2007 or thereafter” (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and
Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006). This means that those minor users who were
not at the table are not held to an agreement they did not help develop and endorse. This
fulfills the principle that all those affected by an agreement should have a voice at the
table (OSE, 2003)
The agreement also, however, affects the solutions to a broader range of issues
that involve additional users who are not at the table. The first of these is that because the
San Juan is a tributary to the Colorado, occasionally use on the river may need to be
curtailed to meet conditions set by the Upper Colorado River Basin Commission. This is
taken care of by ensuring that there are provisions related to this in the agreement.
Specifically the San Juan agreement states that, if the Upper Colorado River Basin
Commission makes a determination that uses needed to be curtailed, “the parties to these
Recommendations agree to meet within thirty days…of the determination to make any
necessary adjustment to the Recommendations” (Recommendations for San Juan River
Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006, pg. 1). The agreement also
interacts with the San Juan Chama Project (SJCP). The manner in which it does so is
governed by Section 11a of Public Law 87-483, which “provides a formula for a sharing
of the water supply among the SJCP and the Navajo Reservoir water supply contractors
in years when the supply is inadequate to meet the demands of the contractors” (Whipple,
January, 12th, 2008). Although, the parties to the San Juan agreement can recommend
that “In the event of a shortage…that Reclamation limit its annual San Juan-Chama
Project diversions for 2007 and 2008 to an annual amount equal to 107,500 AF less the
percentage shortage calculated by Reclamation” (Recommendations for San Juan River
Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006, pg. 6), this recommendation is
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not binding on SJCP contractors (Whipple, January 12th, 2008). In the event that a
shortage condition occurs and Reclamation can not fulfill this recommendation, they
would need to consult with the parties to the San Juan agreement. Upon first glance the
fact that the agreement leaves out the SJCP contractors, may appear to be a significant
weakness to the comprehensiveness of agreement, but it is likely that it is only a minor
weakness, due to its lack of actual physical effect on the amount of water available to
both the San Juan agreement parties and to the SJCP contractors. According to John
Whipple, basin manager, in times of shortage the SJCP is more likely to be limited by
physical water shortages on the particular streams it diverts from than from the
administrative recommendations of the San Juan River Operations and Administration
agreement. Although the San Juan River Operations and Administration agreement
relates in a broad sense to both the San Juan Chama Project and to the Colorado River
Compact, it is not necessary to bring in all of those parties in order for the agreement to
be successful. Adding these parties to the negotiation would likely add unnecessary
complications to a simple agreement to share the waters of the San Juan River.
Relationships with these larger structures can be taken care of by ensuring that there are
provisions in the agreement that relate back to the larger structure and by using external
water institutions like the BOR as intermediaries.
Comprehensiveness principles also indicate that hydrologically related
groundwater should be included in surface water agreements. The San Juan Basin,
unique to New Mexico, however, uses very little groundwater. This means that the fact
that groundwater is not covered by the agreement is for now inconsequential. If, at a later
date, groundwater in the basin starts to be utilized, its inclusion in the San Juan Rivers
Operations and Administration agreement would then be warranted. The agreement also
supports the principle that sound science back agreements by relying heavily on water
professionals like the BOR and OSE for importance calculations and decisions.
Principles for Success in the San Juan Agreement: Management Purposes
In the case of the San Juan agreement the preamble/introduction to the agreement
clearly states that it was made “for the purpose of establishing a cooperative distribution
of water supplies during 2007 and 2008 among users of water from the San Juan River in
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New Mexico” (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration for
2007 and 2008, 2006, pg. 1). The bulk of the San Juan agreement is a fairly detailed
description about how to allocate water under both normal and shortage conditions. The
negotiated limits for diversion are given in either total amount in acre-feet (AF),
diversion rate in cubic feet per second (cfs) (Recommendations for San Juan River
Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006).
I will illustrate how the agreement divides water under normal conditions, using
the amounts for 2008. The diversion amount for the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project
(NIIP) is 224,000 AF, but it can be increased to as much as 229,000 AF
(Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008,
2006). “This allowed increase is in recognition of the continuing development of NIIP
whereby acreage is increased each year as construction progresses” (Recommendations
for San Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006, pg. 3). The
diversion amounts for the Hammond Irrigation Project, San Juan Generating Station, the
Four Corners Power Plant, and the City of Farmington are 26,700 AF, 27,985 AF, 31,000
AF, and 16,000 AF respectively (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and
Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006). These
may include amounts to be diverted under contract with the Secretary of the
Interior, direct flow rights, and/or subcontracts or agreements with other parties.
Also, the diversion amounts listed for the San Juan Generating Station and the
Four Corners Power Plant include diversions by BHP Billiton made at the power
plants’ diversion works for uses at the San Juan/La Plata Mines and Navajo
Mines, respectively (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and
Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006, pp. 1-2).
The diversion amount for the minor Jicarilla Apache Nation subcontracts is 1,055
AF (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007 and
2008, 2006). While the diversion amounts listed above are for total AF, the diversion
amounts for Citizen’s Ditch, Farmer’s Mutual Ditch, Fruitland Irrigation Project, Jewett
Valley Ditch, and Hogback Irrigation Project are given as rates, and are 160 cfs, 110 cfs,
100 cfs, 32 cfs, and 170 cfs respectively. The rates for irrigation projects are seasonal
rates with diversion allowed during the spring through fall growing season, while the
rates for the power plants and the City of Farmington are for year round. The agreement
goes on to state that there are certain amounts diverted by Farmington that will not be
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charged to its diversion amount, including “amounts: (1) diverted for delivery to local
water users associations or to the Navajo Tribal Utility Authority-Shiprock, or (2)
diverted for non-consumptive use at the Farmington hydro-electric power plant”
(Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008,
2006, pg. 3). The Hammond Irrigation Project gets credit for return flows, and the San
Juan Generating Station, Four Corners Power Plant, City of Farmington, and the minor
Jicarilla Apache subcontracts can exceed their diversion limits during November and
December if conditions are sufficiently wet to allow them to do so without causing harm
to other users or to the environmental requirements (Recommendations for San Juan
River Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006).
Principles for Success in the San Juan Agreement: Flexibility
The San Juan agreement has been renegotiated every year since 2003, except for
the most recent agreement which was for the years 2007 and 2008. The agreement has
varied slightly from year to year mostly in the area of small changes in how much water
each user gets from year to year (Whipple, January 23rd, 2008). This renegotiation on a
yearly basis is a major sign of flexibility in the agreement, and this is likely made
possible in part given that the agreement only covers a small number of water users in a
limited area.
The major flexibility to the agreement comes from the use of two relatively novel
strategies. The first of these is shortage sharing. Section III of the Agreement first goes
into the procedure by which the BOR calculates any water supply shortage. This is done
twice a month “using operations studies for the Navajo Reservoir that evaluate monthly
dam and reservoir operations throughout the calendar year 2007 and 2008”
(Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008,
2006, pg. 5). The BOR uses data such as the amount of water in the Navajo Reservoir
above elevation 5990 feet, monthly evaporation estimates, monthly inflow to the
reservoir, anticipated releases based on section II of the agreement, and monthly
diversion amounts. Inflow data is based upon precipitation data from the National
Weather Service with adjustments for “operation of the Vallecito Dam and the San Juan
Chama Project under minimum probable runoff conditions” (Recommendations for San
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Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006).
If the operational studies indicate that reservoir water surface level will fall below
elevation 5990 feet at any time during 2007 or 2008 should the diversion demands
at and below Navajo Dam and Reservoir be fully satisfied, then Reclamation shall
calculate the amount of shortage to the diversion demands that must occur to
prevent the projected water surface level in the reservoir from following below
elevation 5990 feet (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and
Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006, pg. 5).
If a shortage is determined to exist, shortage sharing procedures go into effect.
The percentage by which the diversion will be reduced will be the same for the Navajo
Irrigation Project, the San Juan Generating Station, the Four Corners Power Plant, the
minor Jicarilla Nation subcontracts, and the City of Farmington. The City of Farmington,
however, shall not have its diversions reduced below 13,000 AF in 2008
(Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008,
2006). Although the reason is not explicitly stated in the agreement, this is likely because
much of the City of Farmington’s water is for domestic purposes, and to reduce its
amount further would pose too great a burden. “The water users will determine the time
schedules for bearing their share of any shortage during 2007 and 2008”
(Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008,
2006). If a shortage sharing percentage is calculated that has already been exceeded by a
particular user, then the user must cease to divert water for the remainder of the year,
unless the user acquires transfer water from another user (Recommendations for San Juan
River Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006). The diversions for the
irrigation projects and ditch associations will be shorted by the same amount. In order to
do this,
each ditch or project shall shorten its irrigation season in order to meet its
commitment to reduce irrigation depletions during 2007 and 2008. The end date
shall be moved forward in time from October 31st until the percentage reduction
in irrigation depletion matches the same percentage shortage as calculated by
Reclamation (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and
Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006, pg. 6).
The revised end can be adjusted to give irrigators credit for “delaying the start of their
irrigation season past April 1st or as a result of ceasing diversions during the irrigation
season” (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007
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and 2008, 2006). Diversions by the ditch associations for delivery to domestic water
users can continue even if the irrigation season is shortened (Recommendations for San
Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006).
The second relatively novel strategy is based on the transfer of water rights as
discussed by Section IV of the agreement, “Agreements to Transfer or Broker Water
between Parties. “ This agreement allows the power plants to continue to divert water up
to their full allotment of water via the approval of “subcontracts for delivery of water
from the Navajo Reservoir supply entered between the Jicarilla Apache Nation and the
Public Service Company of New Mexico, the Arizona Public Service and BHP Billiton”
(Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008,
2006, pg. 8). The total amount of water delivered under subcontracts is limited to 8,500
AF. Since this will result in a reduction in water supply, there will be an additional
shortening of the irrigation seasons for all of the irrigation projects/ditch associations.
The power companies in compensation “agree to provide funds to mitigate the effects to
the water supply of any added increment of shortage that is caused by actual diversion of
water under subcontracts” (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and
Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006, pg. 9). The funds are distributed by the power
companies to the bodies in charge of each irrigation project or community ditch who
“may utilize or dispose of said funds in a manner or manners of their choosing to the
benefit of the water users under the project” (Recommendations for San Juan River
Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006, pg. 9). The exact distribution
of funds is given by the agreement, and there is also the possibility of transfers between
other parties to the agreement (Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and
Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006).
Principles for Success in the San Juan Agreement: Dispute Resolution
The San Juan River agreement has a provision, Section 5, specifically pertaining
to dispute resolution. The section, in part, states that
In the event that a dispute should arise regarding the implementation of the
recommendations or the performance of an endorsing party under the
recommendations, the endorsing parties commit to resolve such a dispute in a
cooperative, timely, and effective manner (Recommendations for San Juan River
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Operations and Administration for 2007 and 2008, 2006, pg. 9).
If the parties can not work out the issue amongst themselves, the venue of next resort is to
ask for the assistance of the BOR and/or the OSE in resolving the dispute. The parties do
not waive their right to litigate if the dispute can not be worked out amongst themselves
or with the aid of the BOR and/or the OSE.
Principles for Success in the San Juan Agreement: Definition of Success
The San Juan Rivers agreement(s) appears to be working as intended. According
to John Whipple, basin manager, “The agreements have worked from the standpoint of
ditches self-regulating their diversions within limits that they agreed to” (Whipple,
January 23rd, 2008). Some of the provisions of the agreement have been tested to a
limited extent and found to work as planned. For example, one year a small percentage
shortage was predicted early in the year, and so all the irrigation ditches delayed
irrigating by a few days at the start of the growing season. However, the shortage
sharing provisions have not been tested beyond this limited extent, and the provisions
allowing for the leasing of water rights have not been tested. These provisions of the
agreement have not been fully utilized due to hydrological circumstances having been
generally fairly wet. It will be interesting to see how the agreement(s) fair under more
stressful environmental conditions. For now, however, the parties to the agreement
appear to be happy with how it is working. John Whipple, states that, “I believe that the
parties to date generally have been satisfied with the agreements and the cooperation
shown by all involved” (Ibid). Lastly, the agreement appears to meet the definition of
success for a small local water sharing agreement laid out previously in this paper. There
has not been a priority call on the San Juan River. This is again due to the fact that
hydrologic conditions have been favorable. There has been enough water for all the
parties to the agreement to satisfy their water requirements without having to resort to
either shortage sharing or the undesirable alternative of cutting someone off based upon
the traditional prior appropriations system. While the agreement has thus far worked as
planned, it is impossible to call it truly successful or unsuccessful until there has been a
year where water is insufficient to satisfy all the water requirements of the parties. Under
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these circumstances the shortage sharing provisions and the water sharing agreement as a
whole could truly be tested.
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Conclusion
What can we learn about water sharing agreements in general and how are the
three questions I posed in my introduction answered? Both research into existing water
compacts (McCormick, 1994) and more theoretical research (the Utton Center Model
Compact, and the ASCE Model agreements) indicate several common areas of
consideration and agreement on what constitutes successful water sharing agreements
over a large areas (between states or between countries). Some common areas to be
considered are summarized below.
Table 2: Summary of Factors to be
Considered When Negotiating A
Successful Local Water Sharing
Agreement
Category (Sub-category if Necessary)
Administrative Structure: Clarity
Administrative Structure: Size
Administrative Structure: Legality
Comprehensiveness: Included Parties
Comprehensiveness: Included Water
Comprehensiveness: Science
Management Purposes:
Management Purpose: Water
Allocation
Dispute Resolution:
Definition of Success:

All the factors help the parties successfully negotiate and maintain a method of water
allocation without having to resort to litigation.
Setting up an administrative system that follows the three administrative
principles laid out here (clarity, legality; and size) sets up the structure necessary to
manage the chosen method of water allocation. If there is too little administration,
certain aspects of managing the agreement are likely to fall through the cracks. If there is
too much administration, on the other hand, procedures for doing things may become
overly burdensome.

An administrative structure that is unclear as to who has what

responsibilities or what terminology in the agreement means may be the cause of
disagreements among the parties. The use of principles of comprehensiveness--included
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parties, included water, and the use of science--contribute foresight to the agreement. If
all the relevant parties are included at the negotiating table at the start, the agreement’s
water allocation procedures are less likely to be derailed in the future by a lawsuit or
complaint from a user who was not included. Additionally, if a large water user is left
out, that means that all of the basin’s water is not included, partially defeating the
purpose of using water sharing agreements. The second comprehensiveness principle
relates to this and to the need to include any related groundwater in any given agreement.
Given how much better our scientific understanding of the relationship between ground
and surface water is, related groundwater should be include in water agreements. The
third comprehensiveness principle, the use of science, makes the procedures for
allocating water sounder and makes sure that (1) everyone gets their share, (2) shortages
are properly determined, and (3) the procedures put in place to deal with shortages are the
proper ones. The flexibility principles--duration of agreement and novel solutions--allow
the water allocation procedures to change over time in order to respond to changing
environmental and political realities. Lastly dispute resolution procedures that actively
encourage extensive negotiation before litigation are critical to water allocation
agreements not ending up in ligation. Any water allocation procedure that is backed by
strong science and a larger support structure (as outlined here) can succeed. This can
include traditional temporal priority or alternative administration.
The analysis I’ve done here of the San Juan agreement also indicates how this
framework can be a useful tool for analysis of local water sharing agreements. While the
exact procedures and structures are not the same at the local level as at the state level, the
same principles are relevant to both. An excellent example of this is illustrated by the
area of dispute resolution. The Utton Center Model Compact in Article VIII lays out a
long detailed multi-step process for dispute resolution. The process in the San Juan San
Juan River Operations and Administration agreement is much simpler. Both, however,
follow the principle of negotiation first then resolution by an outside body (either in the
courts or by a state agency). Similar principles are at work in both large and small area
water sharing agreements.
Finally, are local water sharing agreements a useful overall addition to water
allocation procedures? If they work they are. A local water sharing agreement that
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works would prevent conflict amongst water rights holders and decrease depletions on
stream systems. The San Juan agreement has not been tested enough to determine its
success conclusively, but I predict that it will be successful when tested further. My
prediction is based on how well the provisions of this local water sharing agreement track
those of larger interstate compacts that have been better studied.
Alternative administration may be particularly useful as a stop-gap measure in
areas where water rights have not been settled. The shortage sharing procedures part of
alternative administration could also be applied in areas where temporal priority might
threaten junior water users (including municipalities and power companies like in the San
Juan Basin example) with being left without some of the water they need. While
adjudications are absolutely necessary and traditional temporal based administration will
likely continue to be the most common method of water allocation in New Mexico, water
sharing agreements in advance of adjudication can be useful tools to deal with the water
“crisis” in New Mexico and other western states.

39

References
Associated Press. “New Mexico State engineer estimates settling water rights at $300
Million.” November, 2007. Available Online at
http://indiancountrynews.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=201
8&Itemid=33
Constitution of the State of New Mexico, Article XVI. Irrigation and Water Rights
Draper, Stephen. Editor. Model Water Sharing Agreements for the Twenty-First
Century. American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). 2002.
Hall, G. Emlen. Wet Water Law: New Mexico Style: 4th Edition: Volume 1, University
Of New Mexico: Spring, 2007.
Hoffman, Suzanne, Interview. July 21st, 2008.
Interstate Stream Commission. “San Juan Regional Water Plan.” Available Online at
http://www.ose.state.nm.us/isc_regional_plans2.html. 2003.
McCormick, Zachary L. The Use of Interstate Compacts to Resolve Transboundary
Resources. Oklahoma State University. PhD Thesis. 1994.
Muys, Jerome C., George William Sherk, and Marilyn C. O’Leary. “Utton
Transboundary Resources Center Model Interstate Water Compact.” Natural
Resources Journal. 47 (2007) 17-116
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). “Declared Underground Water Basins
Administered by the State Engineer.” Available Online at
http://www.nm.nrcs.usda.gov/Technical/fotg/section1/maps/new/undergroundwaterbasin.jpg. December 2002.
New Mexico Office of the State Engineer (OSE). “2002-2003 Annual Report.” 2003
New Mexico Office of the State Engineer (OSE). Title 19.25.13. Natural Resource And
Wildlife. Administration and Use of Water. General Provisions. Active Water
Resource Management. Available Online at
http://www.ose.state.nm.us/doing-business/ActiveWaterMgt/ActiveWaterMgt2004-12-28.pdf. 2004.
New Mexico Office of the State Engineer (OSE). “Lower Pecos River Basin Water
Master District-Specific Regulations: Frequently Asked Questions.” Available
Online at http://www.ose.state.nm.us/PDF/ActiveWater/LowerPecos/PecosFAQs2006-03-10.pdf. 2006

40

New Mexico Office of the State Engineer (OSE). “Judge’s Ruling Upholds the State
Engineer’s Authority to Adopt Active Water Resource Management Rules and
Regulations.” Available Online at
http://www.ose.state.nm.us/PDF/News/2007/pr-2007-05-21-JudgeRulingAWRM.pdf. 2007

New Mexico Office of the State Engineer (OSE). “The State of Water in New Mexico
2009.” Available Online at
http://www.ose.state.nm.us/PDF/HotTopics/NMWaterLaw-Leadership-NM-200901.pdf. 2009.
New Mexico Statutes Annotated. Chapter 72. Water Law.
O’Leary, Marilyn C. “Water Planning in New Mexico: Enigma, Paradox or Pattern?”
Journal of Land, Resources, and Environmental Law. 24 (2004): 343-347.
“Recommendations for San Juan River Operations and Administration for 2007 and
2008.” December 2006.
United States Constitution. Article I. Section I.
The Utton Center for Transboundary Resources Center (Utton Center). “Water Matters:
Background on Selected Water Issues for Members of the 49th New Mexico State
Legislature. “ Available Online at:
http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/Water_Matters_2009.pdf. 2009.
Whipple, John. “RE: Question related to the San Juan River Operations and
Administration Agreement.” Email to author. January 12th, 2008
Whipple, John. “RE: Question related to the San Juan River Operations and
Administration Agreement.” Email to author. January 23rd, 2008
Yeo v. Tweedy, 1929. Supreme Court of New Mexico.

41

